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The paper analyses urban governance and decentralisation 
in France. It explains the “quiet revolution” which wants 
to set the legal basis of the French local government back 
to the drawing board with special focus on the reform of 
local government in urban areas. The context of the too 
many too small communes – at the heart of the reform 
programme – is described since it is a typically French evil 
(part 2). In the absence of any successful top-down policy 
of amalgamating communes, new communes are deemed 
to be the effective solution along with a new mapping of 
intercommunal joint bodies (part 3). Finally, the paper de-
scribes what the metropolis à la française consists of (part 
4) with a special focus on Lyon – the perfect model for the 
whole country – and Paris and Aix-Marseille as the worst 
pupils in transition.  
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Since the end of the 1950s, deep changes in the economy, transportation 
and culture have affected local communities in their way of life, their areas, 
and their consistency. The 36,700 communes, 101 provinces (départements), 
18 regions1, not forgetting 2,700 joint-working bodies (établissements publics 
de cooperaCn intercommunale, EPCIs) add to the irreducible complexity of 
the local government machinery in France. In spite of successive waves of 
decentralization reforms in 1981-1984, 1999, and 2003-2007, local govern-
ment structure and shape have been kept untouched, especially communes 
which have been at the basis or the French territorial structure since the 
Revolution. The consequence is that whatever its size, and its financial and 
technical means, every local authority, including the smallest commune, 
has kept its status and general competence of free administration that has 
forbidden any kind of hierarchical structure between tiers.
These 36,700 communes are dedicated to the daily management of down-
to-earth policies for the inhabitants’ well-being. Yet, a large majority of them 
are too small to run and finance local services although most of them are re-
luctant to be amalgamated into bigger units. As compensation, the multiple 
joint intercommunal bodies offer an institutional tool to ensure that local 
services are delivered and meet the needs of the communities. They also en-
sure that local economic, social or cultural projects are achieved successful-
ly and coherently. However, joint bodies typically end-up as an additional 
meso government with more and more powers but less democratic control 
and understanding from ordinary citizens (Le Saout, 2012).
To be done with the downside of the now well-documented “institutional 
multi-layer cake” (mille-feuille institutionne; Bazoche, 2013), France em-
barked in a renewed process of decentralisation and reorganisation in 
2010-2015. In June 2014, President Hollande set the principles for local 
government reform plan which should meet four goals: 
1. to half the number of regional councils (from 1st January, 2016); 
2. to draw a new map for intercommunal joint bodies;
3. to abolish the general clause of competence for regional and pro-
vincial councils (consiels départementaux) in view of greater effec-
tiveness and simplification and clarity; 
1From January 1st, 2016: 13 regions in European France (including Corsica, la col-
lectivité territoriale de Corse) and 5 overseas départements-regions (Guadalupe, Martinique, 
Guyana, La Réunion, and Mayotte).
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4. to openly question the future of the latter in the view of abolish-
ing them by 2021. 
In fact, what is at stake is both budgetary cuts and increased considera-
tion for citizens’ needs. 
Interestingly, the reform period spans both presidencies of Nicolas 
Sarkozy and François Hollande, with some inevitable abolished then 
re-introduced bills after successive swings in both houses of Parliament. 
What is different is that President Hollande has declared the end of the 
jardin à la française, a pyramidal system of uniformed local authorities not 
withstanding their specificities. Yet, the idea remains roughly the same: to 
build a new local government structure based on two groups of functions, 
one for development driving and strategy, and the other for closeness to 
local communities. 
Such a clear-cut inception of the working of local government supposes 
two major issues to be solved. Drawing initiatives and strategies raised 
the issue of the size and powers of regional authorities, which led to the 
creation of 13 larger regions instead of 22 in European France from 1st 
January 2016. The 2015 (16 January) Reform Act deals with the regions’ 
areas and voting system at provincial (départementales) and regional elec-
tions, held in March 2015 and December 2015 respectively. The delivery 
of local services to the citizens raises the issue of the size, capacity, and 
responsibilities of communes and their connections with joint intercom-
munal bodies. 
As the third and last part of this local government reform, the 2015 (7 
August) Act (Loi sur la Nouvelle Organisation Territoriale de la République, 
NOTRe) transfers new responsibilities from both the central government 
and provinces (départements) to regional councils and gives a clearer defi-
nition of the responsibilities of each local government tier. Unlike regions, 
provinces and intercommunal councils, only communes are now endowed 
with the general competence of free administration. Meanwhile, the cen-
tral government offices at the local and regional levels are required to 
contribute to the overall reform of governance under the Charte de la 
déconcentration following the 2015 Decree (8 May) on the new setting-up 
of arm’s length state offices and boards (Réorganisation de l’administration 
territoriale de l’Etat, RéATE).
In order to explain the “quiet revolution” that aims to set the legal base 
of the French local government back to the drawing board, the paper will 
focus on the reform of local government in urban areas. The context of the 
too many and too small communes at the heart of the reform programme, 
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needs to be described since it is a typically French evil (part 2). In the 
absence of any successful top-down policy of amalgamating communes, 
new communes are deemed to be the effective solution, along with a new 
mapping of intercommunal joint bodies (part 3). Finally, the paper will 
describe what the metropolis à la française consists of (part 4) with a spe-
cial focus on Lyon – the perfect model for the whole country – and Paris 
and Aix-Marseille as the worst pupils in transition.
2. Too Many Too Small Communes but no 
Amalgamation and the Long-Standing Tradition 
of Joint-Working  
France accounts for the largest number of communes in the EU and for 
more than one third of all EU local government units. Germany accounts 
for only 11,500 communes, Italy for 8,222, and the United Kingdom only 
for 433 local authorities. This means that French communes are smaller 
and more sparsely populated. Only 2.3% of the 36,000 communes are 
above 10,000 inhabitants, while 90% of communes are under 2,000.2 Ex-
cept for the Paris area, no other French city is ranked among the 13 major 
European metropolises. France is characterized by extremely scattered 
communes and a high number of very small communes: 30% of com-
munes have less than 200 inhabitants (Table 1).
According to the constitutional principles, Regions, Départements and big-
ger cities were to be just the same breed of local authority as the smallest 
villages with only a hundred inhabitants. Such has been the issue of too 
many too small communes in France for which a kind of institution-build-
ing skill had to be developed in order to invent various kinds and shapes of 
legal conventions and partnerships between all levels of local authorities, 
both vertically and horizontally.
2 Average population of the French communes is 1,750 inhabitants, while average 
population of the EU communes is 4,100 inhabitants. Furthermore, 74% of all communes 
are under 1,000 (15.26% of the French total population) and only 0.11% of all communes 
are over 100,000 inhabitants (15.36% of total population in France).
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Table 1: Distribution of the French Population 
Communes Population
Strata Number % Number %
Under 500 inhabitants 20,233 55.33 4,572 973   7.36
     500 - 1,000   6,959 19.03 4,907 236   7.90
  1,000 - 10,000   8,490 23.22 22,569 949 36.33
 10,000 - 30,000 644 1.76 10,761 782 17.32
 30,000 - 100,000 203 0.56    9,779 823 15.74
Communes Population 0.11    9,543 210 15.36
Total 36,568 100.00 64,5 million 100.00
Source: Direction générale des Collectivités locales, DGCL, 2015, Ministry of the Interior.
The first attempt to help mergers of communes was voted in 1971 (Loi 
Marcellin) but the outcome met only a limited success. Only 1,100 com-
munes were abolished through mergers from 1971 to 2009, a very small 
number when compared with the mergers that have been, or are still go-
ing on, in most European countries. Due to the decentralization process 
and the many responsibilities transferred from the central government to 
communes, especially in key-domains such as urban planning, the capac-
ity of small communes to implement new powers and functions has often 
been questioned but never tackled. The Government could but hastily 
encourage various forms of joint organizations. 
Table 2:  Principal types of joint working bodies
Joint bodies with 
budgetary contributions 
from the member 
communes
Joint bodies with own fiscal policy 
Categories Syndicats 
intercommunaux, 
syndicats mixtes fermés et 
ouverts including poles 
métropolitains  
(> 100,000 inhabitants), 
poles d’équilibr et 
erritoriaux et ruraux.
Communautés de communes (CC) 
(<3,500-50,000 inhabitants>)
Communautés d’agglomération (CA) 
(>50,000) 
Communautés urbaines (CU) 
(>250,000), 









Goals Jointly designed and 
managed local services 








Better quality of services
Jointly designed and managed local 
planning and development projects 





Mandatory or optional 
Area Freely designed area Continuous with no enclave
Finances Budgetary contributions 
freely  budgétaires, 
freely shared out
Own fiscal policy + central government 
allowance 
Evolution A grouping of 
communes (syndicat) 
may evolve into a mixed 
type if it incorporates 
other categories of 
local authorities than 
communes; or it can be 
transformed into a CC 
or a CA.
Possibly: CCs into CAs or CUs, 
Possibly: CAs  into CUs, and metropolises
Source: Direction générale des Collectivités locales, DGCL, 2015, Ministry of the Interior
Although the amalgamation of communes has been a forceful and stream-
lining process in all neighbouring states, France has never succeeded in 
reducing the number of its communes. Nevertheless, it has established 
several forms of cooperation between communes. Such cooperation first 
appeared at the end of the 19th century. The Law of 22 March 1890 
provided for the establishment of single-purpose intercommunal associa-
tions (Syndicats intercomunaux). After French lawmakers and local coun-
cillors had long been aware that the communal structure inherited from 
the French Revolution was totally inadequate for dealing with a number 
of practical matters, the 1999 Act (Loi Chevènement) launched the era of 
strengthening and simplifying the complex structures into Communauté 
de communes and Communauté d’agglomération. Communautés de communes 
(CC) aim primarily at rural communes; Communautés d’agglomération 
(CA) aim at towns and medium-sized cities and their suburbs; and Com-
munautés urbaines (CU) aim at larger cities and their suburbs. These three 
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structures are given varying levels of fiscal power, with CAs and CUs 
having the strongest fiscal power, levying the local business tax (taxe pro-
fessionnelle) for themselves instead for the communes.
Meeting a big success, this major step in rationalization was inspired by 
the structure which had been imposed on bigger areas thirty years earlier. 
In 1966, several communautés urbaines were tailored for big cities and their 
surroundings: Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Rennes and Strasburg. Then Brest, 
Cherbourg, Dunkerque, Le Creusot-Montceau-les-Mines, Le Mans, 
Alençon, Arras, Nancy, Nantes, Nice, Marseille, and Toulouse gradually 
decided to gather their surrounding communes under the same structure. 
Part of the success has certainly happened because of the money allocat-
ed to them and based on their population, thus providing an incentive for 
the communes to team up and form urban communities.
In its latest statistics on local government, the Ministry of the Interior stat-
ed that there were 2,133 joint bodies with their own fiscal policy in 2015 
(DGCL, 2015). They represent 99.8% of the total communes and 94.0% of 
the total population. This major step comes from the mandatory grouping of 
all communes as imposed in the 2010 Reform Act, in force from July 2013.
Table 3: Incidence of the various types of self-taxation inter-communalities (as 










Communauté urbaine 9 201 2.322.898
Communauté de communes à 
fiscalité professionnelle unique 
1.062 17.704 18.284.334
Communauté d’agglomération 226 4.744 25.889.681
Communauté de communes à 
fiscalité additionnelle
822 13.412 8.622.173
Métropole de Lyon 1 59 1.346.720
Non-integrated municipalities - 70 4 034 615
Source: Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales (Ministère de l’Intérieur, Ministère de 
la Décentralisation et de la Fonction Publique / Insee), 2015, Les collectivités locales enchif-
fresen 2015, p. 8.
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However, these impressive results may hide a murkier reality. In rural 
areas, many communes have joined in a communité de communes only to 
benefit from government funds and the joint body is just an empty shell. 
Rivalries, either political or personal, often work against the spirit of the 
law which has established the new intercommunal structures to carry out 
a much broader range of activities than the mere management of garbage 
collection service. In urban areas, the intercommunal structures are much 
more solid, being created by local decision-makers out of genuine belief 
in the worth of working together. However, in many places local feuds 
had arisen (Desage & Guéranger, 2013) and to set up an intercommunal 
structure for the whole of the urban area was just impossible. In some 
places communes refused to take part in it, or they even created their own 
structure. In many areas, rich communes have gathered with other rich 
communes and refused to let in poorer communes for fear of overtaxing 
their citizens to the benefit of poorer suburbs. 
3. A New Map of Communes and Intercommunal 
Joint Bodies
The picture of France as a laboratory for local government joint working 
is strengthened and no local unit in its territory should escape from being 
re-structured. The mille-feuille territorial that used to be understandable for 
citizens is under major improvement as far as areas, public expenses, and 
better answerability to local needs are concerned.
The 2010 Local Government Reform Act set an ambitious goal to sim-
plify, streamline, and complete the map so that the whole area of France 
would be covered with inter-communal authorities as a more strategic 
and better-financed local authority to complete municipal policies. As al-
ready mentioned, it is mandatory for any municipality to join in one of the 
proposed structures. Only four small islands with a single commune are 
allowed by law to stay apart. These are Ile de Bréhat, Ile de Sein, Oues-
sant in Brittany and Ile d’Yeu off the Vendée shore. Inter-communalities 
have to gather 20,000 inhabitants as a minimum. Their area should be 
designed according to economic and social consistency and large-scale 
projects. They have to be created through a process that would secure 
better integration of the member-communes in order to make inter-com-
munalities jump to a different scale. 
The main goal of the 2010 Reform Act has been to try to solve these prob-
lems. Its three objectives were to complete the map of inter-communali-
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ties before January 2013, to rationalize the existing areas and to simplify 
the present intercommunal structure. The act has made it compulsory 
for every municipality to join in with other communes into new or exist-
ing EPCIs before January 2014. Secondly, it proposes two new forms for 
grouping. One is called metropolis as it is designed for the most populated 
inter-communalities, although according to European standards most of 
them are only medium-sized urban areas. The other form is named pole 
metropolitain (metropolitan cluster), a kind of supra inter-communality 
gathering smaller joint bodies. Finally, as an attempt to revive the pro-
cess of amalgamating communes, the Law proposes the creation of “new 
communes” (communes nouvelles). Officially the new commune is a tool 
for voluntary grouping and not forceful merging of communes and it aims 
at simplifying the legal process and ensuring legal as much as democratic 
flexibility (Guérard, 2012, p. 123).
The socialist and left-wing opposition party groups fought against the 
right-lead Government’s proposals: “We reaffirm our unquestionable at-
tachment to the 36,000 communes of our country, because we believe 
that, thanks to them, the Republic has taken root in every part of the 
territory” (the Honorable MP. Marc Dolez, cited in Guérard, 2012, p. 
116). However, once in power, they agreed, some of them reluctantly, to 
vote in March 2015 for the bill on improving the 2010 regime. The Valls 
Government offered to sign an agreement with “new communes” with a 
population of 10,000 inhabitants ensuring that their central government 
allowance would remain stable for three years in a row. What was surpris-
ing was that the Minister of Finance simultaneously announced an ex-
pected €14.5 billion savings in the national budget as the local authorities’ 
contribution to public finances restored. 
The 2014 Law (Loi MAPTAM) has added a demographic threshold, a 
population of 50,000 people living in a continuous area with no enclave, 
which did not exist in the 1990s for communautés d’agglomération. In rural 
areas, no threshold is prescribed by the law for communautés de communes. 
They should get into integrated communities based on common econom-
ic and development plans. 
The new legislation entails some most striking features: 
– The regime of the new commune has been consolidated by the 
16 March 2015 Act. As of January 2015, 25 new communes have 
existed gathering 70 communes and nearly 64,000 inhabitants. 
Rural areas and towns have been thinking about initiating the 
process, hoping to benefit from governmental subsidies for the 
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following three years (if they had managed to fulfil the require-
ments before the end of 2015). Financial incentives are still the 
best booster for local councillors.
– Creation of bigger EPCIs with over 20,000 inhabitants is coher-
ent with the view of a new local government structure with only 
two tiers: one local, the inter-municipal council, and one regional, 
the regional council.
– Last but not least, the issue of a deficit in democratic legitimacy 
has been dealt with by Parliament in the 2010 Reform Act and 
in the 2013 (Local Elections) Act (Long, 2014). Inter-communal 
councils used to be made up of representatives appointed by the 
municipal councils of member communes. Since the 2014 mu-
nicipal elections, they are elected at municipal elections. Citizens 
choose their representatives in the inter-communal council along 
with their representatives in the municipal council, on voting 
lists, but the candidates’ names are the same; those standing for 
the inter-communal seats are the first names on the voting lists! 
In addition, the creation of the new commune is based on local 
consensus that must be expressed either by the related municipal 
councils or by a local referendum. The choice of the democratic 
process is solely in the hands of the councillors. Data show that 
in reality few local referenda have been organised.
Further regulations have been adopted in order to enhance the attractive-
ness of new communes. The law of 16 January 2015 (Loi sur l’ amélioration 
du régime de la commune nouvelle, pour des communes fortes et vivantes) relax-
es the rules on the composition of the council during the transition period 
while member communes still exist. It also strengthens the role of dep-
uty-mayors (ex-mayors of the abolished communes). The new commune 
which has taken the place of the previous EPCI should better fit into the 
regional map of inter-communalities. The special features of the “dele-
gated communes” should be taken into account and the harmonization 
of communes’ urban plans ought to be clarified. The municipal council 
of the “new commune” substitutes for the previous municipal councils. 
Previous mayors have become “delegated mayors” and the mayor for the 
new commune is elected at the first session of the new municipal council.
On 15th December 2015, 187 new communes were created by prefects’ 
bye-laws instead of 684 pre-existing municipalities. 
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4. The Metropolis à la Française
For historical reasons, the French centralization (concentration of po-
litical, economic, social, and cultural functions in the capital city and its 
region) has hampered the development of provincial urban cities since 
the Revolution and the establishment of the republican regime. However, 
urban development has spilled over political and administrative bounda-
ries and extended to a wider regional area. According to the OECD, met-
ropolitan regions are large concentrations of population and economic 
activities that become functional economic areas. They gather a number 
of various local governments and build upon relationships between mar-
kets and between networks. Different types of metropolitan regions can 
be distinguished depending on the distribution of the population, rela-
tionships between businesses, and existing links and fluxes: with one or 
several centres, with different hierarchies of centrality, or developing as 
an urban network (OECD, 2006). The organisation of the governance of 
metropolitan regions is always a difficult issue, because it has to combine 
several government levels. Metropolitan regions can never be treated as 
single government tiers. Therefore, they require new forms of government 
that are able to liaise with various government scales, depending on areas 
and functions (Hoffmann-Martinot & Sellers, 2008).
Under the Fillon Government and Sarkozy presidency, the 2010 Act in-
vented a new type of EPCI, the metropolis, to meet the special needs and 
characteristics of bigger urban areas (Protière, 2012). Nice-Côte d’Azur 
Métropole is the only example of a metropolis set up under the 2010 Act. 
The mayor for Nice, Christian Estrozy, a leading member of President 
Sarkozy’s political party (UMP now Les Républicains), was pro-active in 
experimenting with the process that was modified in 2014, after the swing 
in the presidential and general elections. As Prime Minister Ayrault put it 
at a 2012 press-conference, the creation of metropolises was the greatest 
innovation of the decentralization reform. It is the first time since 1966 
that special attention has been given to the nine larger urban areas and in 
January 2015 Rennes, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nantes, Brest, Lille, Rouen, 
Grenoble, Strasbourg et Montpellier were transformed into metropolises 
automatically and compulsorily. Paris region needs new legal and finan-
cial means to be the “engine” of France’s economy and its world-class 
capital city (Gilli, 2014). Due to the extreme institutional and political 
fragmentation of its area (Breuillard, 2012; Béhar & Estèbe, 1999), the 
Government needs one more year to achieve its plan, as in the case of Aix-
Marseille-Provence where six EPCIs have been amalgamated into one 
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metropolis. Lyon Métropole, where co-operation and good will have been 
shared by local councillors in all tiers of local government, makes another 
type of metropolis with a status of principal authority, not simply of an 
EPCI. 
Lyon Métropole has the same area as the previous Grand Lyon-Com-
munauté Urbaine, but its status refers to that of a full local authority as 
mentioned in the 1958 Constitution (Art. 72). Most importantly, it plays 
the role of – and has the responsibilities of – the Département within its 
territory. This innovation is the result of an unparalleled consensus be-
tween the two leaders, the Socialist Mayor of the City of Lyon, Gérard 
Coulomb, and the then right-wing president of the Département, Michel 
Mercier.3 Such a long-standing consensus is totally lacking in the case of 
Aix-Marseille and Paris. 
At the end of 2012, the Jean-Marc Ayrault Government announced it 
intended to create the Mediterranean metropolis. The civic society and 
particularly the private sector had been in opposition to the hostile local 
councillors for a long time. The Government appointed an inter-ministe-
rial mission4 chaired by a prefect who wrote a strategic plan for the largest 
urban area in France (3,173 km²), far larger than Paris or Lyon regions, 
for 1.8 million inhabitants in 92 communes (93% of the population in the 
Département des Bouches du Rhône, 37% of the population of the whole 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azue region). 
Instead of two-tier governance – municipal councils of each commune, 
joint council of each intercommunal body, from 1st January 2016 the me-
tropolis is governed by the Metropolitan Council and six area-councils 
which are drawn from the areas of the six previous EPCIs. Such a territoire 
does not exist anymore in the nine “ordinary” metropolises. Communes 
and mayors remain. As in the case of previous communautés urbaines and 
other “ordinary metropolises” the structure, its area, its bodies, its man-
datory and optional responsibilities must be agreed upon by the Govern-
ment and follow the provisions of the 2014 and 2015 Acts (Loi MAPTAM; 
Loi NOTRe). 
Through a similarly top-down process, La métropole du Grand Paris was 
created in January 2016 as an inter-communal body with its own fiscal 
3 After the 2015 Election, Michel Mercier was replaced by Christophe Guilloteau, 
also a member of Les républicains party group. 
4 Mission inter-ministérielle pour le projet métropolitain Aix-Marseille-Provence, by Decree 
of the Prime Minister (16 May, 2013). 
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policy on the basis of the 2014 and 2015 Acts. It covers the City of Paris 
and 131 communes of the three neighbouring départements (Petite Cou-
ronne: Hauts-de Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne) and some 
bigger towns that belong to further départements (Grande Couronne), a 
total population of 7 million and 814 km². As in the case of Aix-Mar-
seille-Provence, it is structured into areas (territoires) incorporating more 
than 300,000 inhabitants. The borders of the areas have been approved by 
the Government and they match the borders of the communes. The pre-
fect of the Ile-de-France Region is in charge of consulting each municipal 
council and each EPCI council about their agreement with the proposals. 
Again, the Government appointed an inter-ministerial mission to draft 
the profile of the metropolis. 
At the top of the pyramidal structure, the metropolis is ruled by the coun-
cil (le conseil métropolitain) i.e. the representatives of member communes. 
At the bottom, each area has its council and leader. As an effective incen-
tive, central government allocates subsidies to the member communes.5 
Greater Paris will implement the classical functions that have been as-
signed to Communautés Urbaines since 1966. These include the elabora-
tion of urban and development plans and the related building permits, 
housing (either social or private), strategy, economic planning, air-pol-
lution and noise prevention planning, climate-friendly and energy-saving 
development planning, etc.
Along with the metropolitan council, the metropolitan assembly (confer-
ence métropolitaine) gathers all mayors of the member communes in the 
area to discuss all metropolitan affairs and to co-ordinate or harmonize 
policies. A third organization is the Conseil de développement, which al-
ready exists for Communautés urbaines, in which representatives of the 
economic actors, voluntary sector and cultural circles make strategic pro-
posals and assess policies. 
Thus, legally speaking the French metropolis implies three very different 
situations: a) a proper local coordinating authority close the status of a 
unitary council in the case of Lyon; b) a better-integrated EPCI as in the 
case of the “ordinary” metropolis and Aix-Marseille-Provence; c) a spe-
cial and unique breed of EPCI around Paris as a transition. This is how 
simplifying structures in France works! In the long run – and in an ideal 
world – the example of Lyon should become the rule for all other metrop-
olises in view of pooling and merging means and resources to become 
5 Pacte financier et fiscal, Code général des collectivités territoriales, Art. 5219-11.
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the co-ordinating engine with strengthened powers compared with the 
present responsibilities of EPCIs, including responsibilities delegated or 
transferred from the upper tiers, Départements and Regions. 
5. Conclusion
As many observers report, France desperately needs to conduct an in-
depth reform of its institutional architecture, which is regularly post-
poned. What is required is a simplification of governmental machinery: 
more efficiency in local policies, a clearer allocation of responsibilities, 
reduced expenses, governance closer to citizens, etc. (Verpeaux et al., 
2015). At a time when cuts in budgets are the rule from top to bottom, 
from central government departments down to the smaller local councils, 
it seems that redesigning of the borders should be of prime importance. 
Simultaneously, the shape and functions of the central government are 
also under reconstruction. The principle of modularity was due to be fully 
enacted by 2016. Nowadays “the state rules [not the country but] territo-
ries in close relation with the French people to adapt to their real condi-
tions of living which are not the same throughout all localities”6 ... while 
the Prime Minister speaks of “Regional state” (Council of the Ministers, 
17 December, 2015.).
Any attempt to redress and simplify local government borders is useful 
but will not be enough. The country needs a fundamental reconstruc-
tion of public policies at all tiers. Moreover, the institutional approach 
to metropolitanisation may have an unintended side effect. It may create 
inter-institutional competition and escalate existing feuds between strong 
metropolitan and regional governments (Degron, 2014). 
France stands out as an important case where new powers bestowed upon 
metropolitan governments have curbed the jurisdictions of regional gov-
ernments. The ambiguity over the powers and functions of local govern-
ments triggers obdurate turf wars between the two levels of government, 
which clearly indicates that the governance of any modern society needs 
to be simplified. If left unaddressed, competition – not coordination or 
cooperation – between regionalization and metropolitanisation, region-
alization and local governments, governability and multilevel governance 
is likely to become the norm (Marcou, 2014). An analysis of foreign ex-
6 Charte de la déconcentration published in May, 2015.
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periences shows that regional institutions may turn against municipal 
self-government. A typical barrier to regional centralization is a principle 
that is applied in all European countries with a unitary constitution, ex-
cept in the Netherlands: an upper level local authority has no supervisory 
or command powers upon local authorities of the lower level. This prin-
ciple is stated in article 72/5 of the French constitution. The develop-
ment of citizen participation at the local level is probably the best way 
to prevent metropolitan and regional centralisation to the detriment of 
municipalities, because citizens’ claims will be generally based on local 
concerns, and because they will strengthen the legitimacy of municipal 
representatives (Estèbe, 2015).
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NEW GOVERNANCE OF URBAN AREAS IN FRANCE: IS 
RATIONALIZATION POSSIBLE?
Summary
The paper analyses urban governance and decentralisation in France. It ex-
plains the “quiet revolution” that wants to set the legal base of French local 
government back to the drawing board with special focus on the reform of local 
government in urban areas. The context of the too many too small communes – 
at the heart of the reform programme – is described since it is a typically French 
evil (part 2). In the absence of any successful top-down policy of amalgam-
ating communes, new communes are deemed to be the effective solution along 
with a new mapping of intercommunal joint bodies (part 3). Finally, the pa-
per describes what the metropolis “à la française” consists of (part 4) with a 
special focus on Lyon – the perfect model for the whole country – and Paris 
and Aix-Marseille as the worst pupils in transition. France stands out as an 
important case where new powers bestowed upon metropolitan governments have 
curbed the jurisdictions of regional governments. The ambiguity over the powers 
and functions of local governments triggers obdurate turf wars between the two 
levels of government, which clearly indicates that the governance of any modern 
society needs to be simplified. If left unaddressed, competition – not coordination 
or cooperation – between regionalization and metropolitanisation, regionaliza-
tion and local governments, governability and multilevel governance is likely 
to become the norm. The author concludes that France desperately needs an 
in-depth reform of its institutional architecture, which is regularly postponed. 
What is required is a simplification of governmental machinery: more efficiency 
in local policies, a clearer allocation of responsibilities, reduced expenses, and 
governance closer to citizens.
Keywords: urban areas, urban governance, France, decentralisation, local gov-
ernment
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NOVO UREĐENJE URBANIH PODRUČJA U FRANCUSKOJ: JE LI 
MOGUĆA RACIONALIZACIJA?
Sažetak
Rad se bavi upravljanjem gradovima i decentralizacijom u Francuskoj. Objaš-
njava se »tiha revolucija« kojoj je cilj izmijeniti pravne temelje francuske lokalne 
samouprave s posebnim naglaskom na reformi lokalne samouprave u urbanim 
područjima. Opisuje se kontekst prevelikog broja premalenih općina, koji je u 
samome središtu programa reforme, zato što je to tipično francuski problem (dio 
2.). Zbog nepostojanja ijedne uspješne top-down politike spajanja općina, nove 
se općine smatraju učinkovitim rješenjem zajedno s novom teritorijalnom ras-
podjelom zajedničkih međuopćinskih tijela (dio 3.). Na kraju rada opisuje se 
od čega se sastoji metropolitansko područje á la française (dio 4.) s posebnim 
osvrtom na Lyon – savršeni model za Francusku – te na Pariz i Aix-Marseille 
kao na najgore primjere prelaznog razdoblja. Francuska se ističe kao važan 
primjer zemlje u kojoj su nove ovlasti date metropolitanskoj razini ograničile 
ovlasti regionalnih vlasti. Nejasnoće oko ovlasti i poslova lokalne i regionalne 
samouprave potiču tvrdokorne sukobe oko područja i nadležnosti između dvije 
razine vlasti, što jasno pokazuje da se organizacija vlasti i javnog upravlja-
nja u svakom modernom društvu treba pojednostaviti. Ako se problem ne riješi, 
doći će do kompeticije, a ne do koordinacije i suradnje između regionalizacije i 
metropolitanizacije, regionalizacije i lokalnih jedinica te upravljivosti i višestu-
panjskog upravljanja. Zaključuje se da Francuska očajnički treba dubinsku re-
formu svoje institucionalne strukture, koja se neprestano odlaže. Ono što zemlji 
treba jest pojednostavljenje sustava vlasti i javnog upravljanja: veća učinkovitost 
lokalnih javnih politika, jasnija podjela poslova i odgovornosti, smanjenje troš-
kova i vršenje vlasti što bliže građanima. 
Ključne riječi: urbana područja, upravljanje gradovima, Francuska, decentra-
lizacija, lokalna samouprava
